Projects          Goals           Comments          Site Category Map           Donate          Contact Us          Awards

Pandemic

Pronunciation: pan-'de-mik

Function: noun
: a pandemic outbreak of a disease

Function: adjective
Etymology: Late Latin pandemus, from Greek pandEmos of all the people, from pan- + dEmos people: occurring over a wide geographic area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population <pandemic influenza>

Credit:Merriam-Webster

The Impact of a Pandemic

A pandemic may come and go in waves, each of which can last for six to eight weeks.

An especially severe influenza pandemic could lead to high levels of illness, death, social disruption, and economic loss. Everyday life would be disrupted because so many people in so many places become seriously ill at the same time. Impacts can range from school and business closings to the interruption of basic services such as public transportation and food delivery.

A substantial percentage of the world's population will require some form of medical care. Health care facilities can be overwhelmed, creating a shortage of hospital staff, beds, ventilators and other supplies. Surge capacity at non-traditional sites such as schools may need to be created to cope with demand.

The need for vaccine is likely to outstrip supply and the supply of antiviral drugs is also likely to be inadequate early in a pandemic. Difficult decisions will need to be made regarding who gets antiviral drugs and vaccines.

Death rates are determined by four factors: the number of people who become infected, the virulence of the virus, the underlying characteristics and vulnerability of affected populations and the availability and effectiveness of preventive measures.

Pandemics and Pandemic Threats since 1900

1918: Spanish Flu

The Spanish Influenza pandemic is the catastrophe against which all modern pandemics are measured. It is estimated that approximately 20 to 40 percent of the worldwide population became ill and that over 50 million people died. Between September 1918 and April 1919, approximately 675,000 deaths from the flu occurred in the U.S. alone. Many people died from this very quickly. Some people who felt well in the morning became sick by noon, and were dead by nightfall. Those who did not succumb to the disease within the first few days often died of complications from the flu (such as pneumonia) caused by bacteria.

One of the most unusual aspects of the Spanish flu was its ability to kill young adults. The reasons for this remain uncertain. With the Spanish flu, mortality rates were high among healthy adults as well as the usual high-risk groups. The attack rate and mortality was highest among adults 20 to 50 years old. The severity of that virus has not been seen again.

1957: Asian Flu

In February 1957, the Asian influenza pandemic was first identified in the Far East. Immunity to this strain was rare in people less than 65 years of age, and a pandemic was predicted. In preparation, vaccine production began in late May 1957, and health officials increased surveillance for flu outbreaks.

Unlike the virus that caused the 1918 pandemic, the 1957 pandemic virus was quickly identified, due to advances in scientific technology. Vaccine was available in limited supply by August 1957. The virus came to the U.S. quietly, with a series of small outbreaks over the summer of 1957. When U.S. children went back to school in the fall, they spread the disease in classrooms and brought it home to their families. Infection rates were highest among school children, young adults, and pregnant women in October 1957. Most influenza-and pneumonia-related deaths occurred between September 1957 and March 1958. The elderly had the highest rates of death.

By December 1957, the worst seemed to be over. However, during January and February 1958, there was another wave of illness among the elderly. This is an example of the potential "second wave" of infections that can develop during a pandemic. The disease infects one group of people first, infections appear to decrease and then infections increase in a different part of the population. Although the Asian flu pandemic was not as devastating as the Spanish flu, about 69,800 people in the U.S. died.

1968: Hong Kong Flu

In early 1968, the Hong Kong influenza pandemic was first detected in Hong Kong. The first cases in the U.S. were detected as early as September of that year, but illness did not become widespread in the U.S. until December. Deaths from this virus peaked in December 1968 and January 1969. Those over the age of 65 were most likely to die. The same virus returned in 1970 and 1972. The number of deaths between September 1968 and March 1969 for this pandemic was 33,800, making it the mildest pandemic in the 20th century.

There could be several reasons why fewer people in the U.S. died due to this virus. First, the Hong Kong flu virus was similar in some ways to the Asian flu virus that circulated between 1957 and 1968. Earlier infections by the Asian flu virus might have provided some immunity against the Hong Kong flu virus that may have helped to reduce the severity of illness during the Hong Kong pandemic. Second, instead of peaking in September or October, like pandemic influenza had in the previous two pandemics, this pandemic did not gain momentum until near the school holidays in December. Since children were at home and did not infect one another at school, the rate of influenza illness among schoolchildren and their families declined. Third, improved medical care and antibiotics that are more effective for secondary bacterial infections were available for those who became ill.

1976: Swine Flu Threat

When a novel virus was first identified at Fort Dix, it was labeled the "killer flu." Experts were extremely concerned because the virus was thought to be related to the Spanish flu virus of 1918. The concern that a major pandemic could sweep across the world led to a mass vaccination campaign in the United States. In fact, the virus--later named "swine flu"--never moved outside the Fort Dix area. Research on the virus later showed that if it had spread, it would probably have been much less deadly than the Spanish flu.

1977: Russian Flu Threat

In May 1977, influenza A/H1N1 viruses isolated in northern China, spread rapidly, and caused epidemic disease in children and young adults (< 23 years) worldwide. The 1977 virus was similar to other A/H1N1 viruses that had circulated prior to 1957. (In 1957, the A/H1N1 virus was replaced by the new A/H2N2 viruses). Because of the timing of the appearance of these viruses, persons born before 1957 were likely to have been exposed to A/H1N1 viruses and to have developed immunity against A/H1N1 viruses. Therefore, when the A/H1N1 reappeared in 1977, many people over the age of 23 had some protection against the virus and it was primarily younger people who became ill from A/H1N1 infections. By January 1978, the virus had spread around the world, including the United States. Because illness occurred primarily in children, this event was not considered a true pandemic. Vaccine containing this virus was not produced in time for the 1977-78 season, but the virus was included in the 1978-79 vaccine.

1997: Avian Flu Threat

The most recent pandemic "threats" occurred in 1997 and 1999. In 1997, at least a few hundred people became infected with the avian A/H5N1 flu virus in Hong Kong and 18 people were hospitalized. Six of the hospitalized persons died. This virus was different because it moved directly from chickens to people, rather than having been altered by infecting pigs as an intermediate host. In addition, many of the most severe illnesses occurred in young adults similar to illnesses caused by the 1918 Spanish flu virus. To prevent the spread of this virus, all chickens (approximately 1.5 million) in Hong Kong were slaughtered. The avian flu did not easily spread from one person to another, and after the poultry slaughter, no new human infections were found.

In 1999, another novel avian flu virus - A/H9N2 - was found that caused illnesses in two children in Hong Kong. Although both of these viruses have not gone on to start pandemics, their continued presence in birds, their ability to infect humans, and the ability of influenza viruses to change and become more transmissible among people is an ongoing concern.

Timeline of Human Flu Pandemics

Credit:NIH

Translating The National Strategy For Pandemic Influenza Into Action

The Federal Government Is Releasing The National Implementation Plan To Help The Nation Prepare For The Possibility Of A Pandemic. Shortly after announcing the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, the White House led the development of an Implementation Plan for the National Strategy. The Implementation Plan provides clear direction to Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, communities, and the private sector on the actions that must be taken to prepare for a possible pandemic across the following six functional areas:

• International Efforts - Prevent And Contain Outbreaks Abroad
• Transportation And Borders - Slow The Arrival And Spread Of A Pandemic
• Protecting Human Health - Limit Spread And Mitigate Illness
• Protecting Animal Health - Control Influenza With Human Pandemic Potential In Animals
• Law Enforcement, Public Safety, And Security - Ensure Civil Order During A Pandemic
• Planning By Institutions - Protect Personnel And Ensure Continuity Of Operations

The Implementation Plan provides a common frame of reference for understanding the pandemic threat and summarizes key planning considerations for all public and private stakeholders. It also requires that Federal departments and agencies take specific coordinated steps to achieve the goals of the Strategy and outlines expectations of non-Federal stakeholders in the United States and abroad. The Implementation Plan will be continually updated and revised.

The Importance Of Preparedness By Individuals, Communities, And The Private Sector

Individuals Must Actively Participate. Simple infection-control measures including hand washing and staying home when ill are critical. Individuals should actively participate in their communities' responses.

State And Local Governments Must Prepare. Pandemics are global events, but individual communities experience pandemics as local events. State and local governments, with clear guidance from the Federal Government, should be prepared to implement community-wide measures, such as school closures and suspension of public gatherings, to halt the spread of disease.

The Private Sector Must Prepare. The private sector, with targeted and timely guidance from the Federal Government, should develop plans to provide essential services even in the face of sustained and significant absenteeism. Businesses should also integrate their planning into their communities' planning.

Four Federal Priority Actions In The Implementation Plan

1. Advance International Capacity For Early Warning And Response.

• Advance International Cooperation: Working through the U.S.-initiated International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, secure international commitment to transparency, scientific cooperation, rapid reporting of human and animal cases, and sharing of data and viral isolates.
• Build International Capacity: Provide technical assistance to build veterinary and public health capacity in at-risk countries and to detect and contain animal and human outbreaks of avian influenza, including development and exercise of preparedness plans.
• Ensure Rapid Response: Develop the Federal Government's capability to respond rapidly, either independently or in support of an international response, to animal or human outbreaks of influenza with pandemic potential for purposes of assessment and containment.

2. Limit The Arrival And Spread Of A Pandemic.

• Ensure Early Warning And Situational Awareness: Enhance domestic avian influenza surveillance in humans, wild birds, and poultry.
• Establish A Border And Transportation Strategy: Develop a comprehensive border and transportation strategy that strikes a balance between efficacy of interventions to delay and limit the spread of disease and the economic and societal consequences, international implications, and operational feasibility of these interventions.
• Establish Screening Protocols And Implementation Agreements: Establish arrangements with international partners to voluntarily limit travel and establish screening for travelers from affected areas.

3. Provide Clear Guidance To All Stakeholders.

• Ensure Effective Risk Communication: Implement educational and risk communications programs to increase national and international awareness of the risks of avian influenza and appropriate behaviors to reduce these risks. Ensure that timely, accurate, and credible information is provided by spokespeople at all levels of government during an outbreak.
• Provide Guidance On Distributing Urgent Resources: Develop and share with State, local, and tribal public health officials and the medical community strategies for optimizing the allocation of scarce medical resources during periods of sharp surges in the need for medical services and mechanisms for incorporating additional health care providers within defined settings.
• Provide Comprehensive Guidance To Limit The Spread Of Disease: Develop for State, local, and tribal partners a template for community containment that builds upon data available from state-of-the art modeling and scientific understanding of influenza biology and patterns of transmission.
• Provide Clear Guidance For The Public And Private Sectors: Develop pandemic planning guidance for private sector, Federal, State, local, and tribal entities.

4. Accelerate The Development Of Countermeasures.

• Develop Rapid Diagnostics: Support development of rapid, sensitive, and accurate diagnostic tests, to be used in the clinical setting and for screening.
• Establish Stockpiles Of Vaccine And Antiviral Medications: Build stockpiles of pre-pandemic vaccine and antiviral medications and define strategies for use.
• Advance Technology And Production Capacity For Influenza Vaccine: Develop cell-based vaccine-manufacturing methods, increase domestic vaccine production capacity, and advance the development of next-generation influenza diagnostics and countermeasures, including the most effective methods of preparing for and responding to a surge in demand for medical services.

credit: NIH, The White House,CDC

Check Out The Other 175+  Subjects on solcomhouse

Data compiled from The British Antarctic Study, NASA, Environment Canada, UNEP, EPA and other sources as stated and credited  Researched by Charles Welch-Updated dailyThis Website is a project of the The Ozone Hole Inc. a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization